For Derrida, a decision that is truly worthy of its name takes place only by passing through the undecidable, its own undecidability, that is, by passing through its own impossibility, the impossible itself.
According to Derrida, to decide according to the already decidable, that is, to decide on the basis of a pre-determined code, an already established norm or law, or a governed and fixed way in which deciding traditionally and usually takes place, is not a deciding at all, for that which seems as deciding is, in fact, nothing but a repetition of the already known, said, thought, and imagined, a confirmation of an already established rule, and a mere obeying of a given obligation or order.
Derrida thus says that any decision that is truly worthy of its name must occur within the undecidable; that is, it must pass through the undecidable, the impossibly decidable, so that it could occur; it must pass through its own impossibility so that it could take place.
“Worthy of its name” implies that there does not exist what is worthy of its name. That is, “worthy of its name” problematizes the possibility that there might be existing what is worthy of its name; it problematizes this possibility by exposing it to its own impossibility. Hence, “worthy of its name” is Derrida’s attempt at problematizing, that is, deconstructing, what seems simple, unproblematic, unquestioned, and hence dominant.
Derrida’s aim is neither to render deciding paralyzed nor to render every attempt at deciding impossible, but rather to render deciding absolutely responsible and to show the singularity and uniqueness that every decision should hold within itself.
Deciding, Derrida says, should be radically distanced from the already possible possibilities, towards the impossible, the singular, and the inventive. There is thus a constant sense of urgency in every decision, in every act of deciding, worthy of its name, for it awaits no one; it awaits nothing, since it lies beyond the already planned, thought, known, determined, and governed; that is, singular and inventive deciding lies beyond and exceeds what is already decidable. This urgency always obliges one to decide too soon. Yet no matter how soon one decides, one is already late.
Since the decision that is worthy of its name is singular and inventive, it cannot be repeated, reproduced, or mastered. The impossibility surrounding and pervading the singular and inventive decision renders impossible all attempts at reproduction, imitating, or repeating.
Again, this referring of all deciding to what is impossible is not an attempt at rendering illegitimate every act of deciding or all decisions; this referring to the impossible is merely an endeavor to render apparent how unconditional deciding dwells in the origin of deciding and hence renders it non-simple.
In other words, this problematizing of the notion of decision is only a reminder that a conversation or a negotiation between the conditional and the unconditional should always take place in every act of deciding; the conditional and the unconditional in deciding, for the origin is itself never simple, pure, present, self-contained, or self-same; the origin, of deciding, is itself a relation between the possible and the impossible, the conditional and the unconditional, that is, between presence and absence, self-sameness and otherness.
Philosophy and Death
Death is a recurrent theme in the thinking-philosophizing of Plato. There are, therefore, many ponderings on grief, mourning, sorrow, and healing in the dialogues philosophizing and thinking toward death and dying. The fear of death, Plato says, burdens humans while they are awake and haunts their dreams.
Schopenhauer on Death and Afterlife
In the thinking-philosophizing of Schopenhauer, death is central because it is linked together with the “will-to-live”. Death is the fragility pervading our existence; a fragility necessarily delivering into philosophizing
At the end of Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger says that investigating the everydayness of Dasein makes understandable and hence brings nearer to Dasein’s being, yet it does not bring Dasein wholly, completely, or fully face to face with itself; that is, it does not bring “Da-sein as a whole in view”.
Heidegger on “Being-Toward-Death”
For Heidegger, death brings closer to the question of the meaning of Being: “Death opens up the question of Being”. Heidegger says that only to the human being belongs the possibility of being brought face to face with death: “Only humanity ‘has’ the distinction of standing and facing death, because the human being is earnest about Being: death is the supreme testimony to Being”.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre criticizes Heidegger’s conception of death in Being and Time and offers his own account of the finitude of existence, which is grounded not in the certainty of death, but rather in our choices and freedom.
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