Heidegger discusses death at length in Being and Time. This article introduces Heidegger’s existential conception of death and revisits the relation into which Heidegger brings Dasein’s death, everydayness, and anxiety together.
Is Experiencing Dasein as a Whole Possible?
At the end of Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger says that investigating the everydayness of Dasein makes understandable and hence brings nearer to Dasein’s being, yet it does not bring Dasein wholly, completely, or fully face to face with itself; that is, it does not bring “Da-sein as a whole in view”. (The article ”What Is ”Dasein”?” explains what Heidegger means by Dasein)
The mere everydayness of Dasein does not allow Dasein to have itself completely and fully in view. Division One thus ends with three questions problematizing and examining this full and complete bringing of Dasein face to face with itself. According to Heidegger:
“But is the most primordial, existential, and ontological constitution of Da-sein disclosed with the phenomenon of care? Does the structural manifoldness in the phenomenon of care give the most primordial totality of the being of factical Da-sein? Has the inquiry up to now gotten Da-sein as a whole in view at all?”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
The last question speaks of “Da-sein as a whole”, yet what this totality or wholeness means remains unclear. Perhaps what renders that which is meant by this wholeness or totality even more obscure and problematic is that, according to Division One of Being and Time, “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence”, and accordingly Dasein cannot be understood as a thing, as that which has a pre-defined, pre-determined, or fixed essence or nature. That is, the being whose essence is its existence cannot be brought before itself as a whole, for it “essentially” resists and renders impossible any attempt at wholeness or totality. According to Heidegger:
“And if existence determines the being of Da-sein and if its essence is also constituted by potentiality-of-being, then, as long as Da-sein exists, it must always, as such a potentiality, not yet be something? A being whose essence is made up of existence essentially resists the possibility of being comprehended as a total being”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
To the being of Dasein, whose essence is nothing but its existence, thus belongs an incompleteness that renders any attempt at bringing Dasein wholly and fully before itself impossible. This means that because Dasein’s essence is its existence, as long as Dasein is and exists, it is impossible to glimpse or achieve this wholeness or totality.
This impossible totality or wholeness thus puts forward or implies a different way through which Dasein can be brought before itself as a whole. That is, the moment at which Dasein reaches its end, when it no longer exists, is the moment that renders Dasein whole.
Seeing death as the end shows Dasein as that which has a beginning that is incessantly and necessarily heading towards an end symbolizing a specific totality or wholeness. This way of perceiving death as the end of Dasein allows Dasein to assume a certain wholeness or entirety that could be investigated and thought. In other words, the end of Dasein renders possible a totality through which the whole of Dasein can be fully brought into view.
But thinking Dasein’s wholeness through the end of Dasein is problematic, for it rests upon a paradox or an impossibility. That is, when Dasein reaches its end, it ceases to exist and disappears. This disappearance means that there is no longer any wholeness awaiting to be brought into view and investigated. This end of existing means that that which has reached its end “cannot be experienced as a being”.
“However, if Da-sein ‘exists’ in such a way that there is absolutely nothing more outstanding for it, it has also already thus become no-longer-being-there. Eliminating what is outstanding in its being is equivalent to annihilating its being. As long as Da-sein is as a being, it has never attained its ‘wholeness.’ But if it does, this gain becomes the absolute loss of being-in-the-world. It is then never again to be experienced as a being”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Dasein’s death, once reached, means the disappearance of Dasein and hence the impossibility of any investigating of Dasein and Dasein’s totality, that is, the impossibility of any bringing of the wholeness of Dasein into view, for there is no Dasein to be brought before itself.
Hence, this way of approaching the totality of Dasein through Dasein’s end is problematic, since it negates Heidegger’s demand that wholeness is be carried out only through the bringing of a specific and existing Dasein face to face with itself.
In other words, the attempt at approaching Dasein and its being through a totality or a wholeness that is rendered possible only when Dasein disappears and ceases to exist is philosophically problematic and perhaps impossible, since the end, or the death, of Dasein is the moment of the disappearing of Dasein. The end means that there is no longer a Dasein; Dasein disappears and hence it cannot experience or approach itself as a totality.
Death signifies the end of Dasein’s worldly existence, that is, the end of Dasein’s existing in the world. Death indicates the impossibility of any wholeness or totality concerning Dasein’s existence. This impossibility, according to Heidegger, shows that the attempt at grasping Dasein as a wholeness depends on a misunderstanding of Dasein’s existence.
“Did we not conclude in a merely formal argumentation that it is impossible to grasp the whole of Da-sein? Or did we not at bottom inadvertently posit Da-sein as something objectively present ahead of which something not yet objectively present constantly moves along?”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
An Existential Analysis of Death
What is thus required, according to Heidegger, is that “an ontologically adequate, that is, an existential concept of death” is to be attained. This “existential concept of death” depends on what the attempt at grasping a certain totality concerning Dasein’s being has shown, which is the fact that Dasein cannot either live through or experience its own death.
According to Heidegger, although seeing death as the end of existence might “posit Da-sein as something objectively present” and hence misrepresents Dasein’s being, it brings nearer to what might be “an existential concept of death”, for it shows death as a boundary limiting Dasein’s possibilities and potentialities.
Death renders apparent how limited Dasein’s possibilities are and how finite Dasein’s existence is. An existential concept of death portrays and conveys the finitude rendered apparent by the limit announcing the end of Dasein’s existing in the world, a limit that is itself within existence and within the world.
Death, existentially conceptualized, thus brings nearer to, and renders phenomenologically understandable, Dasein’s finitude. That is, death, not as an end attempting to grasp an impossible wholeness, but rather as a conception existentially thought and investigated so that a phenomenological investigation of Dasein’s finitude could take place.
What Heidegger means by death, existentially and ontologically, is neither the mere fact of being dead nor the moment or the events after which Dasein stops existing in the world. Such events or moments, for Heidegger, are topics for fields such as religion, biology, or law, but they do not belong to the ontological and existential investigation in which Heidegger is interested. According to Heidegger, such events or moments see death as a distinct and specific occurrence taking place at a particular time in the future.
This way of seeing and understanding death, for Heidegger, is not important, for it does not contribute much to any phenomenological research, since it has now become clear in Being and Time that seeing death as the end says and adds nothing because this end is neither here nor now and even when it is reached, Dasein itself does not survive to witness, experience, or think it, for the end means the disappearance of Dasein.
An existential concept of death, on the other hand, sees or treats death as a possibility. “Possibility” here does not mean that something might or might not happen in the future; possibility here indicates a way through which, a way in terms of which, Dasein can project itself. But what does it mean that death is a possibility?
According to Heidegger, death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility; a possibility that is non-relational and cannot be outstripped or bypassed. Although these three characteristics or features of death as a possibility can be interpreted in relation to any understanding of death as an event, in which the end of Dasein takes place, they refer to something that is more integral to Dasein’s being itself.
In other words, such features show death as something belonging to, and lying at the heart of, the entirety of Dasein’s existence rather than an event occurring at a certain time in the future.
This is why Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s being as “being-toward-death”, which indicates that death belongs to the being of Dasein itself and not something that is opposed to it and happening to it from the outside.
Death as Dasein’s Ownmost
Death as Dasein’s ownmost possibility means that it is completely and entirely Dasein’s own. That is, even if the death of Dasein can be postponed, delayed, or avoided in some situations, it cannot be transferred, or passed on, to any other Dasein, it remains Dasein’s ownmost.
Even if a specific Dasein sacrifices itself for another Dasein and hence dies, it merely dies instead of the other Dasein and for it; that is, it does not die the other Dasein’s death, but rather its own death.
Another Dasein might die instead of me and, in doing so, it dies its own death and not my own death. According to Heidegger, although to the majority of Dasein’s possibilities in the world belongs the opportunity of being represented by another Dasein, where one Dasein can take the place of another, only in death Dasein cannot be represented by another Dasein.
“Indubitably, the fact that one Da-sein can be represented by another belongs to the possibilities-of-being of being-with-one- another in the world. In the everydayness of taking care of things, constant use of such representability is made in many ways”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
In death, on the other hand, Dasein cannot be represented by another Dasein:
“However, this possibility of representation gets completely stranded when it is a matter of representing the possibility of being that constitutes the coming-to-an-end of Da-sein and gives it its totality as such. No one can take the other’s dying away from him. Someone can go ‘to the death for an other.’ However, that always means to sacrifice oneself for the other ‘in a definite matter.’ Such dying for . . . can never, however, mean that the other has thus had his death in the least taken away. Every Da- sein must itself actually take dying upon itself. Insofar as it ‘is,’ death is always essentially my own”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Death Is Non-Relational
The non-relationality of death means that death is a possibility into which Dasein can project itself regardless of the relations in which Dasein finds itself with others. That is, the majority of Dasein’s possibilities are relational, which means that they require the existence of another Dasein in order for them to announce themselves.
For instance, the possibility of becoming a professor not only suggests or implies, but also requires the existence of things such as universities, academic departments, classrooms, courses, students, and so on.
Death, on the other hand, as a possibility in terms of which Dasein can project itself, announces and confirms itself within Dasein’s being, which is itself a “being-toward-death”, as that which does not either depend on or require any other Dasein or any other relation. That is, Dasein is always dying and will certainly die regardless of the relations in which it finds itself either to its environment or with others.
Death Cannot Be Bypassed
Death is non-relational and accordingly it cannot be bypassed; it is a possibility announcing and confirming itself regardless of the relations in which Dasein finds itself with others. This means that death is non-optional.
That is, relational possibilities might change or be changed, depending on Dasein’s situation, and hence they can be bypassed. For instance, the possibility of becoming a professor might be given up or pursued and accordingly the whole of Dasein’s relations with others and to its world will change in accordance with Dasein’s decision.
The way in which such relations change when Dasein projects another possibility does not affect Dasein’s mortality, which is itself an indicator showing and rendering clear how and to what extent death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility.
This why is Heidegger says that “death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein”. But what does it mean that “death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein”?
This means that death limits and restricts every other possibility into which, or in terms of which, Dasein might project itself. Death is the rendering finite of all the possibilities of Dasein. As a possibility into which and in terms of which Dasein projects itself, death always “lies ahead” of Dasein, restricting and showing how finite Dasein’s possibilities are. Death “lies ahead” as the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein.
Death shows how all the possibilities of Dasein are only temporary, limited, and short-lived, awaiting being ended by that which is Dasein’s ownmost. Death, as “an eminent imminence”, and not as a specific occurrence taking place at a specific time in the future, defines and decides Dasein’s life, for it renders apparent how Dasein’s own life belongs to, and is thrown into, a certain history and restricted by a limited time.
Death places Dasein in a specific relation to time, in which Dasein acknowledges its mortality. In its “being-toward-death”, time is that through which Dasein’s being unfolds. When mortality is acknowledged in this way, Dasein finds itself placed in a certain relation to time, in which time shows itself as both what links Dasein to and what distances it from that which cannot be bypassed, that is, death. This is what Heidegger means when he says that Dasein “is concerned about its being in its very being, then care must need time and thus reckon with time”.
Death and Everydayness
The existential concept of death shows Dasein as projecting itself in terms of a possibility that is its ownmost, non-relational, and that cannot be bypassed. In Being and Time, Heidegger turns toward this existential concept of death after encountering the difficulty or perhaps the impossibility of reaching a wholeness of Dasein.
As has been explained above, this wholeness is impossible because it cannot be attained while Dasein is still alive, that is, when Dasein’s end has not been reached yet, but even if Dasein reaches its end and dies, this wholeness remains impossible, since the end means the disappearance of Dasein.
The existential concept of death shows how death belongs wholly to Dasein and its being. Death decides Dasein’s whole being as “being-toward-death”. In this deciding, death announces itself as what cannot be either evaded or passed on to another Dasein, for it is that toward which Dasein is always heading.
Yet what Heidegger notices regarding Dasein’s attitude, in its everydayness, toward the deaths of others is a tendency to conceal death as a possibility, a tendency to treat death as something that is distant.
Heidegger says that in Dasein’s everydayness the deaths of others do not remind Dasein of what is its ownmost, but rather allow it to distance itself as far as possible from its own death. This means that, according to Heidegger, the deaths of others allow Dasein to cover over or escape its own finitude.
This covering over, this escaping, occurs because Dasein, in its everydayness, sees and experiences the deaths of others as events that take place only at the end of life. This way of experiencing the deaths of others, according to Heidegger, transforms death into a future event that will take place only in the future, not here and now: “one also dies at the end, but for now one is not involved”.
Heidegger says that “in such talk, death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has to show up from somewhere, but which right now is not yet objectively present for oneself, and is thus no threat”. This means that “dying, which is essentially and irreplaceably mine, is distorted into a publicly occurring event which das Man encounters”.
Heidegger’s mentioning of the notion of “das Man” here shows how this avoiding and denying attitude toward death permeates Dasein’s everydayness; that is, how Dasein, in its “falling”, is completely immersed and scattered into the anonymous and dominant ways and patterns according to which the everydayness of Dasein is formed, shaped, and decided.
According to Heidegger, “entangled, everyday being- toward-death is a constant flight from death. Being toward the end has the mode of evading that end – reinterpreting it, understanding it inauthentically, and veiling it”.
This means that everydayness veils death and hence tranquilizes Dasein by distancing it from its ownmost possibility. Everydayness allows Dasein to flee death by concealing it from Dasein in such a way that encourages Dasein to carry out this fleeing. This concealing allows death to appear as an event that only happens to others, never to oneself, and only in a distant future, never here and now.
This way of seeing and experiencing death prevents Dasein from living its own death and from projecting it ahead of itself as its ownmost possibility. Das Man, which dominates Dasein’s everydayness and decides it, conceals death and hence allows Dasein to flee it. Das Man misrepresents death in such a way that allows Dasein to flee its ownmost possibility. Heidegger says that das Man “does not permit the courage to have Angst [anxiety] about death”.
Death and Anxiety
Heidegger’s turning to anxiety here leads back to Division One of Being and Time, where the concept of anxiety was first introduced and discussed. The notion of anxiety is closely linked together with Heidegger’s existential concept of death.
For Heidegger, anxiety is a fundamental attunement and hence it allows Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” as a whole” to be revealed and brought into the open. That is, the way in which Dasein finds itself in the world decides how everything in the world shows itself up to Dasein. This means that the way in which Dasein finds itself determines how the world shows itself to Dasein. In other words, the way in which Dasein finds itself in the world is thus constitutive of this specific appearing and showing up of the world. (The article ”Heidegger on ”Moods”: An Introduction” explains what Heidegger means by “Befindlichkeit”)
What differentiates anxiety as a fundamental attunement from any attunement, into which Dasein might find itself absorbed, is that it does not only reveal Dasein’s “being-in-the-world as a whole”, but also Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” as such. This means that anxiety reveals Dasein’s existence to itself, yet completely detached from, and emptied of, all of its projects and commitments. Anxiety, according to Heidegger, separates Dasein from its projects and commitments and renders Dasein’s world insignificant.
“The totality of relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and objectively present is completely without importance. It collapses. The world has the character of complete insignificance. In Angst we do not encounter this or that thing which, as threatening, could be relevant”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Anxiety is not fear, since in anxiety “we do not encounter” that which is threatening, yet anxiety resembles fear, but what separates it from fear is that in anxiety there is no specific thing that might be promoting these feelings. Fear, on the other hand, takes place and announces itself only as a response to a specific thing, that is, a specific scenario, event, object, subject, or situation: “The only threat which can be “fearsome” and which is discovered in fear always comes from innerwordly beings”.
From the first pages of Being and Time, Heidegger says that Dasein is a being whose being is an issue for it. The reason why anxiety reveals Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” as such is that in anxiety Dasein comes suddenly and violently face to face with its whole existence as an issue, as that which is still undecided and undetermined, and hence as something that is still a “not yet”.
This is also a difference between how anxiety reveals, and brings into the open, the whole of Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” as such and between deliberation, although deliberation might be that which triggers anxiety. Deliberation might lead to fear as a response to a certain pondering of a different possibility in terms of which Dasein might be projecting itself, but anxiety is something different.
Heidegger says that “that for which Angst [anxiety] is anxious is not a definite kind of being and possibility of Da-sein”. Anxiety arises when Dasein is confronted with its possibilities, that is, when Dasein has to choose: “Angst [anxiety] reveals in Da-sein its being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, that is, being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself”. Anxiety individualizes Dasein by bringing it face to face with “ownmost potentiality-for-being”.
“Angst [anxiety] individuates Da-sein to its ownmost being-in-the- world which, as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Thus along with that for which it is anxious, Angst [anxiety] discloses Da-sein as being-possible, and indeed as what can be individualized in individuation of its own accord”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
When Heidegger speaks of Dasein’s “ownmost being-in-the-world”, he is linking together anxiety and death in such a way that shows how both notions lead to each other, and how both notions are closely related to each other. Dasein’s coming face to face with its possibilities is at the same time Dasein’s coming face to face with its own possibility of impossibility, that is, its death.
This means that Dasein confronts its potentiality-for-being as limited and finite. Dasein’s inability to escape its finitude means that Dasein’s existence is completely its own, its ownmost.
“Anticipation lets Da-sein understand that it has to take over solely from itself the potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned absolutely about its ownmost being. Death does not just “belong” in an undifferentiated way to one’s own Da-sein, but it lays claim on it as something individual”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Heidegger here does not speak of fear, but rather of “anticipation”, since that with which Dasein comes to face in its anxious “being-toward-death” is not a certain event that might or might not occur. That is, when death is seen as an event, it might show itself as what can be evaded and accordingly Dasein’s fear might be diminished. Yet this alleviated fear does not change Dasein’s finitude at all. The possibilities showing themselves to Dasein “are determined by the end, and so understood as finite”. This means that Dasein’s existence is neither endless nor infinite.
For more articles introducing Heidegger’s thought, visit this webpage.